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Abstract
Does international tax competition in the environmental field lead to undesirably
low levels of environmental regulation and to unacceptable disruptions of environmental
quality? The paper tries to answer this question in a non-competitive partial-equilibrium
framework. There is one firm that wishes to establish a plant in one of n countries. The
paper shows that tax competition may lead to emission taxes that are either too low or too
high. They may be so high that the investment is not undertaken although this would be
optimal if the countries cooperated. On the other end of the spectrum, a scenario in which
taxes are driven to zero becomes possible if there are substantial transfrontier pollution
effects.
1. Introduction
Do changes in environmental regulation lead to the delocation of polluting
industries? If they do, does this create incentives for the policy maker to adjust environ-
mental taxes and standards in such a way that delocation is avoided? These are two of the
central questions in the current debate on environmental policies in open economies.
Business people often argue that tough environmental standards negatively affect the com-
petitiveness of domestic firms or of the domestic economy as a whole. In the long run, the
firms that are affected by this policy will move to countries with less restrictive environ-
mental policies. Environmentalists fear that policy makers listen too much to these
arguments and that they are forced to implement lax environmental standards for reasons of
international competitiveness. Ultimately, so the argument goes, this may lead to a kind of a
rat race where each country tends to undercut the environmental taxes prevailing elsewhere
and this may have disastrous consequences for environmental quality.
The first question as to whether environmental regulation has an impact on industry
location is an empirical one. Several studies have addressed this issue and the results are
ambiguous. Walter (1982) evaluates data on the sectoral and firm levels and comes to the
conclusion that generally there is no evidence that pollution-intensive industries have
I am indebted to Horst Siebert and Ingo Thomas for helpful comments.moved to less regulated countries or regions. Delocation has taken place only in special
cases, when major projects have been obstructed for environmental reasons. Similar results
are obtained by Bartik (1988) and Leonard (1988). Rowland/Feiock (1991), in contrast,
come to the conclusion that environmental regulation does affect locational decisions of in-
vestors in the US chemical industry. The relationship found by Rowland/Feiock (1991) is
highly non-linear: there is a threshold value of pollution-abatement costs below which dis-
location effects of environmental-policy changes cannot be observed. Hettige/Lucas/
Wheeler (1992) and LucaslWheelerlHettige (1992) report that there has been a relocation of
environmentally intensive industries to developing countries. They infer this from the fact
that low-income countries have experienced higher growth rates of pollution intensity per.
unit of output than high-income countries during the seventies and eighties, when industrial-
ised countries tightened their environmental standards. Similar results are reported by
Low/Yeats (1992). Thus, one may conclude that there is some evidence that environmental
regulation affects locational decisions but there are large differences in the responsiveness
of different sectors towards environmental policy changes.
The second question whether the threat of delocation may lead to a disastrous com-
petition among jurisdictions is the subject of this paper. Only a small number of papers have
dealt with this question up to now. This literature may be divided into two branches.
- On the one hand, there are competitive models which look at the economy as an aggreg-
ate. They are based on the traditional approach to international factor movements devel-
oped by Jasey (1960), MacDougall (1960), and Kemp (1964). Examples are the Long/
Siebert (1991) and Rauscher (1994) models of international capital movements. It is
shown there that welfare-maximising policy makers are not interested in undercutting
foreign environmental taxes. Environmental policies may, however, be used to influence
the remuneration of the mobile factor. The capital-rich country, striving for a high
interest rate, prefers a lax environmental policy whereas the capital-poor country chooses
a tough policy since this tends to reduce the world market rate of interest Only if
exogenous forces like lobbies are introduced, a rat race becomes feasible.
- On the other hand, there are partial-equilibrium models of non-competitive markets.
One-country models of this type have been developed by Markusen/Morey/Olewiler
(1993) and Motta/Thisse (1994). They generalise the Brander/Krugman (1983) model of
reciprocal dumping by making the number of firms and plants endogenous. The numberof firms that are active on the supply side on the market depends inter alia on the envi-
ronmental regulation. Changes in emission taxes or standards may induce firms to close
down plants or open new ones. With these changes in market structure, it is not surpris-
ing that even marginal changes in environmental regulation may have large effects on
environmental quality and welfare. The model has been extended to two countries by
MarkusenlMoreylOlewiler (1992) and Ulph (1994). They consider the jurisdictional com-
petition explicitly. It is shown that not only the rat race leading to low environmental
standards in both countries is possible but also a scenario for which MarkusenlMoreyl
Olewiler (1992) have coined the term "not in my backyard". In this case, the number of
polluting firms is smaller than the optimal one.
The present paper falls into the second category, that of non-competitive partial-
equilibrium models. It uses a variant of the MarkusenlMoreylOlewiler (1992) model which
is simplified in some respects and more complicated in some others. MarkusenlMoreyl
Olewiler (1992) consider a situation where there is one polluting firm which decides upon
the location of its plants. Entry by additional firms is excluded by high set-up costs. There
are two kinds of fixed costs, that of being in the market and that of setting up a plant. The
variable costs include pollution abatement and trade costs. The firm may build a plant in the
home country, in the foreign country, in both of them or in neither of them, and the decision
is influenced by the environmental policies in the two countries. Unfortunately, this model
turns out to be rather complex even in the case of only one firm. MarkusenlMoreylOlewiler
(1992), therefore, use a numerical example to derive some results! The present model tries
to avoid this complexity by neglecting trade costs. Thus, a scenario in which the firm opens
up more than one plant is not possible: a single plant suffices to serve the whole market.
The model then turns out to be solvable rather easily and the results can be interpreted
neatly. The additional features of the model are the larger number of countries and the con-
sideration of transfrontier pollution problems.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3
characterises the cooperative solution. Section 4 deals with jurisdictional competition in a
world in which all countries are equal and where there is no transfrontier pollution. Section
5 introduces diversity and transboundary pollution spillovers. The final section summarises
the results.2. The Model
Consider a market for a good whose production is subject to increasing returns to
scale and substantial environmental externalities. Increasing returns tend to lead to non-
competitive market structures and in this model there will be a natural monopoly: a single
firm serves the whole market for final goods. In the factor market, the firm is a price taker
since it competes with firms that are active in other sectors of the economy. The production
requires an environmental resource as an input This input is used up during the production
process and this contributes to environmental deterioration. The jurisdiction which hosts the
polluting plant wishes to avoid unnecessary depletion of environmental resources and,
therefore, regulates the producer by imposing a tax on the use of environmental resources.
This will be referred to as "the emission tax" during the rest of the paper. The jurisdiction
which hosts the producer is not the only one; there are other jurisdictions that are potential
locations of the polluting plant. Thus, there are n+1 relevant actors in the model, one firm
and n jurisdictions. The jurisdictions will be called "countries" for the sake of convenience.
It should, however, be noted this term encompasses all kind of jurisdictions down to the
community level that enjoy some discretion and sovereignty in their environmental policies.
The model structure is the following one. The producer is a monopolist vis-a-vis
the consumers. She decides whether to build a plant or not, where to build it and how much
to produce. She takes as given the environmental regulation. Thus, the government of the
hosting country is a Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis the monopolist. If governments do not co-
operate, they play Nash against each other, and each country takes the environmental tax
rates in the rest of the world as given. This game is solved in the usual backward fashion.
The firm
Due to large fixed costs, there will never be more than one supplier in the market.
If these fixed costs are interpreted as being set-up costs of a plant and if transport and other
trade costs are sufficiently small, there will be only one plant from which the whole market
is served. Fixed costs being deduced, the production is characterised by constant returns to
scale. This implies that the variable costs are c(w,t)q. q is the output, t is the environmental
tax rate, w is a vector of remunerations of the private factors of production and c(.,.) is the
unit-cost function. c(.,.) is increasing in its arguments, concave and homogenous of degree
one. The utilisation of environmental resources, which is proportional to emissions, e, isdetermined by Shephard's lemma. Choosing the units of measurement appropriately,
emissions can be written as
(1) e = ct{w,t)q
where the subscript represents the partial derivative of a function with respect to the
variable in question. Let the countries be identical with respect to demand and let the in-
verse demand function in each country be p(q/n). Then, the profits turn out to be
(2) 77 = p(q/n)q - c(yv,t)q - f
where/denotes the set-up costs the firm has to bear if it raises a plant. The first-order con-
dition for profit maximisation is
(3) p{qln) + £M»)± = C(VM)
and this condition is sufficient if the revenue function is strictly concave. We assume that
this is the case. The profit-maximising output, q, depends on the emission tax rate, t. Let
this be denoted by a function co(t). Its slope is
where the arguments of the functions have been dropped for convenience. In the case of a
linear demand function, this can be simplified
The graphical representation is straightforward. Figure 1 depicts the aggregate
demand curve, q(p), the marginal-revenue curve, nv, the marginal cost line, c(w,t), and the
average cost curve, ac. The initial scenario depicts a situation where the price is larger than
the average cost, i.e. where the firm makes a profit. If the emission tax is raised, the cost
curves will be shifted upwards, the supply will be reduced and finally profits may turn out
to be negative. The plant will not be built. This situation is depicted by dashed lines in the
diagram.Figure 1: Behaviour of the monopolist
The critical tax level, f, at which the firm decides not to build the plant can be
determined by setting 77=0 in equation (2), using the first-order condition, (3), and noting







This formula states that the mark up over marginal costs must equal the average fixed cost.
Total differentiation yields the expected result that f is a declining function of/. The higher
the fixed cost the smaller the tax rate necessary to make the firm leave the market.
The n countries
As far as demand is concerned, the n countries are identical. However, they may be
different with respect to the effects of pollution. These differences may be due to asym-
metries in the transfrontier pollution process, to differences in assimilation capacities, and
to differences in preferences, e.g. in environmental concern. All these aspects are captured
in a single parameter, a'i (ij=l,..n). This parameter denotes the effect of one unit ofemissions in country i on the environment in country j. The environmental disruption is
evaluated by an increasing and convex damage function d(.).
There is one major difference between the host country and the rest of the world:
tax revenues are appropriated by the host country. The other positive welfare component,
which is equal for all countries however, is the utility derived from consumption, i.e. the




where q now (and for the rest of the paper) denotes the profit-maximising output of the





3. Coordinated environmental policies
If the countries coordinate their environmental policies, they maximise the total
welfare, i.e. the sum of all w' (i=l,...,n). A cooperative solution may require side payments
in order to compensate potential losers. These need not be considered explicitly, since they
are neutral transfers that do not affect the allocation. It is assumed that the properties of the
welfare function are such that someone will host the firm; the boundary solution, q = 0, will
not be considered in much detail. The first-order condition for an optimum is
(8)
where country i is the host country. The left-hand side of this equation represents the
marginal reduction in environmental damage due to an increase of the emission tax. On the
right-hand side, there is the marginal cost of this tax increase. It consists of a change in the
tax revenue and a reduction of consumer surplus.
Since there are n potential host countries, there may be up to n different solutions
to equation (8) and it depends on the values of d>, which location is the optimal one. Some
special cases may be considered:- No transfrontier pollution (a'i=Q for i*j). The country with the lowest a" should host the
polluter.
- Equal impacts on all countries (aii=a
kl for all ij,k,l,=\,...ji). This is the case of a global
environmental problem where the damage is independent of where the pollutant is dis-
charged. All potential locations are equally optimal.
- Linear damage function (d=0). The country i for which V .$ is minimised should host
the firm.
For the general case where the a'J differ across countries, an explicit solution of the optim-
isation problem is impossible.
The policy determined by equation (8) is not the best policy. There are two dis-
tortions in the model, an environmental externality and the non-competitive market
structure. A truly optimal policy would require additional policy instruments.
1 This is, how-
ever, not the subject of the analysis in this paper.
Figure 2 illustrates the case without transboundary pollution. Four curves are de-
picted:
- Environmental damage, d, is a declining function of the tax rate. The second derivative
with respect to t is
"(
y) *"
1 An optimal policy would emulate a competitive market by setting an upper bound of
the price such that it equals the marginal cost In this case, the monopolist has to be
supported by a lump-sum subsidy equalling the fixed cost. An emission tax rate serves
the purpose of internalising the environmental externalities. The optimal tax formula
would resemble equation (8). However, ai would be different since dqldt = ncjp'.
Under normal circumstances, this first-best policy would be characterised by a higher
tax rate than the second-best policy. If the monopolist is allowed to behave like a
monopolist, she saves environmental resources by restricting her output. If the mono-
polist's power is reduced by government intervention, the emission tax rate has to be
raised.and its sign is indeterminate in the general case. If, however, the production function is
Cobb-Douglas and the demand function is linear, then c/H>0 and o)"=nctt/(2p')>0. These
are sufficient conditions for the environmental damage being a convex function of the
tax rate.
The tax revenue, tr, is an increasing function of the tax rate if the tax rate is small and
may have a negative slope for large tax rate. This is the Laffer-curve property. The
second derivative is
2{caq + cfi)') + (cmq + 2caO}' +cte>")t
This curve is concave for small values of t and may be convex for larger values.
Consumer surplus, cs, is a declining function of the tax rate. In the case of a linear
demand function, the marginal consumer surplus turns out to be ell. Thus, the cs curve is
concave in this case.
The fourth curve is obtained by the addition of tax revenue and consumer surplus.
Figure 2: Optimal environmental policy10
The optimum tax rate, t*, is located where the d curve and the (tr+cs) curve have the same
slopes. Figure 2 depicts an interior optimum, i.e. t*<t
c.
4. Non-cooperative environmental policies
Now consider a situation in which the n countries compete for the foreign investor.
For the sake of simplicity, we will start with a situation in which all countries are equal and
there is no transboundary pollution. The country that hosts the foreign investor imposes two
externalities on the rest of the world. First, the goods that are produced in the polluting plant
are available abroad and this generates consumer surpluses in the other countries. Second,
the host country appropriates the whole tax revenue, which is then not available for other
countries. The cost of being the host is the domestic environmental damage.
Figure 3: Jurisdictional competition
Figure 3 depicts the situation from the point of view of a single country for
different types of the environmental-damage function. d
l represents a situation in whichenvironmental damages are rather small and d
2-, d
3, and d
4 depict damage functions with
higher levels of environmental damage for given emission taxes. Since the damage function
is simply shifted upwards, the optimal tax rate, t*, is not affected, (tr+cs)
1 represents tax
revenue plus consumer surplus from the point of view of a single country. This function lies
below the (tr+cs) line of the cooperative case since a single country receives only one nth of
the total consumer surplus.
Consider first a scenario in which each country (correctly) conjectures that there
will be someone who will host the polluter. In this case, the consumer surplus accrues to
any country independently of whether it decides to be the host itself or not. Thus, the decis-
ive variables are the tax revenue and the environmental damage. Assume that the environ-
mental damage is small (d
x). Over a wide range of tax levels, the tax revenue exceeds the
environmental damage. In these situation, each country is better off if it itself hosts the
polluter than if the plant is located abroad. Since the firm moves to the country with the
lowest tax level, each country has an incentive to undercut foreign emission taxes. This in-
centive vanishes when tax revenue equals environmental damage, i.e. at tax level of f
1. This
is the case of a rat race. Jurisdictional competition results in under-regulation and too much
pollution.
In case 2, the environmental damage is larger (<fi). The range of positive net wel-
fare effects for the host country is reduced. At the optimal tax level, t*, the environmental
damage exceeds the tax revenue and none of the countries takes the burden of hosting the
polluting plant. The jurisdictional competition results in a tax level t
2, which is too high.
The host country allows the monopolist to pollute its backyard, but only a little bit.
If the environmental damage is even larger (tfi), it exceeds the tax revenue for all
tax rates below f. However, the total benefit, (tr+cs)
1, is larger than the cost of environ-
mental disruption. Thus, even the host country would benefit if the investment were under-
taken but it prefers the plant to be established elsewhere. This is a chicken-game situation.
2
The host country is the chicken. This game has n pure-strategy equilibria and it is not clear
In order to fully characterise the game, something has to be said on the outcome of the
game if more than one country offers to be the host It is assumed that in this case the
monopolist throws dice and that the probability of becoming the host country is equally
distributed. The payoff then is the expected welfare.12
whether one of them will be attained. See Fudenberg/Tirole (1991, 18-19). If mixed strat-
egies are used, a scenario becomes feasible in which the plant is not built although everyone
would benefit from it. If the plant is built, the tax rate r
3 will be offered by the chicken. This
is the tax rate at which the country maximises its national welfare, i.e. (tr+cs)'-d. It is too
high.
3 It should be noted that the relationship between environmental damage and the emis-
sion tax is non-monotonous. A reswitching phenomenon turns up as we move from scenario
2 to scenario 3.
Finally, if the environmental damage is very large (</*), none of the countries bene-
fits from being the host. The investment will not be undertaken because of the traditional
prisoners' dilemma problem. It would be individually irrational to provide the consumer sur-
plus to the citizens of other countries if this results in an individual welfare loss. This cor-
responds to the "not in my backyard" scenario of the MarkusenlMoreylOlemler (1992)
paper.
Two effects generate the deviation from the desirable environmental policy. On the
one hand, the host country appropriates the tax revenue. If this is large compared to the
environmental damage, the jurisdictional competition will induce the governments to under-
cut tax rates imposed elsewhere. On the other hand, there is the consumer surplus of which
the home country can appropriate only one nth. This generates the potential for a prisoners'
dilemma when the cost of being the host is large.
Finally one may wish to consider a scenario where it is not optimal from a global
point of view that the investment be undertaken. If the global welfare effect of the invest-
ment is negative, then the welfare loss for any potential host country is even greater. There
are no incentives to become the host. An investment which is undesirable, will never be
made. This result may, however, be changed if transfrontier pollution is introduced.
f
3>f* because the consumer surplus is a declining function of the tax rate. Since global
welfare contains n times the consumer surplus of a single country, the single country's
welfare function has a larger slope than the global welfare function for any value of t.I Imfifuh fur Welfrwirfceheft
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5. Differences between countries and transfrontier pollution
The preceding analysis was based on a simplified version of the model in which all
countries are equal and there are no transfrontier pollution spillovers. These assumptions
will be abolished now. In a first step, the case of differences between countries will be con-
sidered. We will then turn to the issue of transfrontier pollution.
If countries are different, i.e. if a"*a/i for »'*/', then the country with the lowest a"
will be able to undercut the other competitors and will host the polluting plant - provided
that the net benefit (tax revenue minus damage) is non-negative. This is efficient since the
polluting plant should be located where the environmental cost is minimised. But this
country will in general not choose the optimal tax rate, t*. It is easy to show that in a world
with different countries it is less likely that the optimum tax rate, t*, is undercut than in a
homogeneous world. This can be seen from Figure 3. Let us assume that the damage
function depicted in this figure is that of the country with the lowest a". The jurisdictional
competition will be stopped when the country with the second lowest level of a" reaches the
break-even point where tax revenue equals environmental damage. The remaining country
may have an incentive to reduce the tax rate even more if this is welfare improving.
However, it will never be rational to reduce the tax rate towards the level at which the net
benefit vanishes. Thus, the tax rates offered by the country are larger than r
1 and f
2,
respectively. There will be a tendency towards larger tax rates. Of course, the cases of the
chicken game and the prisoners' dilemma are also feasible.
Next consider the case of global pollution, where the damage to the environment is
independent of the source of the emission. Examples are ozone depletion due to CFC emis-
sions or the greenhouse effect. In this case, all a'' are equal. The game can be solved in two
steps. First, one may ask whether there will be a country that offers to be the host. This will
happen if the sum of tax revenue and consumer surplus exceeds the environmental damage
to a single country. This may be the case even in a situation in which it is not desirable from
a cooperative point of view that the investment be undertaken.
4 The jurisdictional compet-
ition now takes the following shape. The opportunity cost of undercutting foreign tax rates
In a cooperative situation, the investment is desirable if tr+(cs-d)>0. For a single
country, the criterion is fr+(cs-d)/n>0. It is obvious that the second condition is
satisfied if the first one is satisfied but not vice versa.14
becomes infinitesimally small. Like the consumer surpluses accrue to all countries indepen-
dently of who is the host, environmental disruption is now independent of the locational
decision of the monopolist as well. Thus, from the point of view of an individual govern-
ment, a discrete change in tax revenue has to be compared to marginal changes in consumer
surplus and environmental disruption. In order to appropriate the tax revenue, the countries
will undercut each other's emission tax rates until the tax revenue becomes marginal. There
will be a tax competition towards a zero tax rate.
Finally, let us consider the general case where there is transboundary pollution and
the countries are different. In order to exclude a tax competition towards zero regulation, it
is assumed that each country is the main source of its own pollution, i.e the diagonal
elements of the transfrontier-pollution matrix dominate the other elements in each column
(aU>aii for all ij,i*j). If the environmental damage is a linear function of emissions, then it
is best to locate the polluter in country i, for which the sum of all a'i (j=l,...,ri) is minimised.
This is, however, not necessarily the country that will win the jurisdictional competition.
And even if it were, the emission level would presumably be too high. Assume that there is
a country that has an incentive to make the first move and host the polluter. Then the tax
competition is driven by the following rationale. The benefit of being the host is the tax
revenue. The opportunity cost is the domestic environmental damage minus the damage that
would occur via transborder spillovers if the plant would be set up abroad. One country after
the other drops out of this tax game until the two countries with the lowest opportunity costs
remain in the game. This pair of countries is characterised by
min(max(a'W'V-a'>))
(9) w
Of these two countries, the country with the lower value of cP -d> becomes the host
country and the larger value of a
11 -a'
1, determines the tax rate that is finally charged per
unit of emissions from the investor. Like in the case of no transfrontier pollution and differ-
ent countries, two additional scenarios are possible. There may be an interior optimum if the
country that is finally established as the host country can increase its welfare by further tax
reductions. Moreover, it is possible that no one wants to have the polluter in her or his back-
yard if the self-pollution effects are substantial.
As an example consider the problem of North-Sea pollution. Due to the predom-
inant direction of currents, the transfrontier pollution matrix tends to be nearly triangular. It15
would be efficient to locate polluting firms on the Eastern shore, for instance in Denmark.
However, Great Britain has the lowest self-pollution coefficients and, therefore, has the best
position in the jurisdictional competition - at least at a first glance. One may argue that the
enterprise will be located in the wrong country and the level of regulation will be too low.
However, if Denmark is threatened by pollution from the United Kingdom, its opportunity
cost of hosting the polluter shrinks. Denmark may therefore be ready to undercut the low
British tax rates in order to reap the net benefit from hosting the plant.
6. Final remarks
We have analysed a very simple model of endogenous market structure and envi-
ronmental-tax competition. It has been seen that there is a large variety of solutions ranging
from a rat race with zero taxes to the chicken game and the case of "not in my backyard".
The deviations from jointly optimal policies can be substantial. Therefore, optimistic views
of international tax competition that are based on competitive general-equilibrium models
may turn out to be misleading if markets for environmentally intensive goods are non-
competitive.
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Of course the model is simplistic in various respects. For instance the endogeneity
of market structure is modelled in a rather simple fashion: either no investment is under-
taken or a monopolist will run a single plant. However, as the paper by MarkusenlMoreyl
Olewiler (1992) has shown, even a small extension of the model by adding an additional
plant fortifies its complexity and one relies on numerical examples for a solution. Another
simplification of the model is the consideration of environmental taxes as the only policy
instrument. This may be appropriate when jurisdictions are concerned that have some dis-
cretion in their environmental policy but no sovereignty in other issues. A really sovereign
jurisdiction should, however, take other possibilities into account. There is more than one
distortion in the model and a welfare-maximising policy, therefore, requires more than a
single policy instrument. Extensions of the model into this direction are desirable. Finally
one may question the emphasis which is placed on tax revenue in this paper. There are two
5 Similar conclusions have been drawn by Ulph (1994) from policy simulations with a
calibrated oligopolistic model.16
replies to this. First, it may be true that green taxes do not generate a substantial tax revenue
nowadays but this may change. The current debate on the so-called double dividend, for in-
stance, emphasises the revenue-raising potential of environmental taxes. At the moment, tax
revenues are generated predominantly by distortive taxes (e.g. on labour income). Green
fees and taxes may be used to generate the same tax revenue in a much less distortive
manner. See Repetto (1992), for instance. Second, even if green tax revenues are not sub-
stantial, one could consider other benefits of foreign direct investments that may be more
relevant in the political decision making process. An example is the reduction of unemploy-
ment. This could be modelled by the introduction of an additional variable into the welfare
function or by the explicit consideration of the labour market. The basic results, however,
would the same as in the case of tax revenues.
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